ADM Jabalpur case & H.R. Khanna's dissent
"However good a constitution may
be, it is sure to turn out to be bad because those who are called to work it,
happen to be bad lot. However bad a constitution maybe it may turn out to be
good if those who are called to work it, happen to be good lot." - Dr. BR
Ambedkar. The speech made by BR Ambedkar in the constituent assembly turned out
to be true when the constitutional powers were exploited by the then Prime
Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The dawn of the dark began when on 26th
June 1975, Internal Emergency was declared by Mrs. Gandhi’s repressive
government. Maintenance of Internal Security Act was passed by Parliament
during the emergency and several opposition members, including student leaders,
were put to jail as per MISA without any reasonable cause along with which extensive
censorship was imposed. Maintenance of Internal Security act was a draconian
law passed by parliament empowering Mrs. Gandhi’s government with vast
arbitrary powers for preventive detention for indefinite period, search and
seizure without warrant authority. Jayaprakash Narayan, LK Advani, Atal Bihari
Vajpayee were some of the iconic leaders who were sent to jail. The one
landmark case in the legal archive of India that occurred during the Emergency
was ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla[1], popularly known as the
Habeas Corpus case. The facts of the case are that several leaders were put to
detention according to recently passed MISA provisions. Constitution of India
provides a provision for writ of Habeas Corpus under Article 32 and Article 227
to be filed in Supreme Court, and High Court respectively. Habeas Corpus writ
is filed to secure release against an illegal detention/arrest of a person
without any reasonable assertion. Such a writ could be filed by anyone for the
release of a detenue and such detentions could only be upheld if the facts
assert a strong case against detenue. Several writs were filed in different
High Courts all over India against arbitrary imprisonment. The state
governments in such petitions contended the preliminary objection of
maintainability of the writs that since the emergency has been imposed and all
the fundamental rights were suspended by the President under Article 359, no
cause arise for the court to entertain the writs with the assertion that
Article 21 in itself was suspended during Internal emergency as per President’s
order dated 27 June 1975. However, High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay, Delhi,
Karnataka, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh & Punjab held that it was open to
entertain such writs if the petitioner showed that the detainment was
ultra-vires MISA and not done in accordance with its provisions. Various state
governments along with the Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court of
India to challenge the orders of 9 High Courts. The appeal was heard by a
5-judges constitution bench consisting of Hon’ble Chief Justice A.N. Ray, and
Justice H.R. Khanna, Justice M.H. Beg, Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, and Justice
P.N. Bhagwati. The judgment shook the entire country and was indeed a black day
for the Indian judiciary. The confidence of the public in Judiciary seemed to
vanish. The majority judgment of 4:1 stated in view of Presidential order dated
27 June 1975 held that “no person has right to move a writ petition under
Article 226 before the High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ, to
challenge the legality of detention order on the ground that the order is not
under or in accordance with the act, or is illegal, or is vitiated by
mala-fides, factual or legal, or is based on extraneous considerations.” The
only judge dissenting was His Lordship Justice HR Khanna who wrote in his
dissenting judgment stated that the Power of High Court to entertain a writ
under Article 226 is an integral part of the Constitution and it can’t be
swayed upon by any kind of internal disturbance in the country. The words of
the learned judge were – “Even in the absence of Article 21 of the
constitution, the state has got no power to deprive a person of his life or
liberty without the authority of law. This is the essential postulate and basic
assumption of the rule of law and not of men in all civilized nations. Without
such sanctity of life and liberty, the distinction between a lawless society
and one governed by laws will cease to have any meaning, the principle that no
one shall be deprived of his life or liberty without the authority of law is
rooted in the consideration that life and liberty are priceless possessions
which cannot be made the plaything of individual whim and caprice and that any
act which has the effect of tampering with life and liberty must receive
sustenance from and sanction of the laws of the land.” His lordship’s judgment
was based on the facet of Rule of law which stated absence of Arbitrariness.
However, as the judgment was passed along with the dissent of Justice Khanna
who was due to become Chief Justice after A.N. Ray. The cost of the dissent was
that he was superseded by Justice M.H. Beg because of his minority dissent. It
was in fact foreseen. Fali S. Nariman, a respected jurist has written in his
autobiography – “It was directly as a result of the dissent in this case that
Justice Khanna was subsequently ‘superseded’ in January 1977 when it was his
turn as the senior-most judge, to be appointed Chief Justice of India. Contrary
to long standing practice, he was not appointed Chief Justice of India. Khanna
then promptly resigned.”
Dissent until 80’s in the Supreme Court’s bench was extremely rare and
done in exceptional circumstances only. At that time, it was considered that
the bench must speak in a single, irrevocable judgement. There are basically
three types of judgment: Majority judgment – where majority of judges in a
bench agree, concurring judgment – where a separate judgment is written by a
judge though agreeing with the decision of majority judgment but on a different
standing, and Dissenting judgment – where the judge does not agree with the
view taken by rest of the bench in the case
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| Justice H.R. Khanna Source : Wikipedia |
[1] 1976 AIR 1207, 1976 SCR 172
[2] In 11 per cent cases there was at
least one dissent, and in 4 per cent cases there was at least one dissent and
one concurrence. Nick Robinson et al, 'Interpreting the Constitution: Supreme
Court Constitution Benches since Independence', Economic and Political Weekly,
26 February 2011, pp. 27-31, 28.
[3] Ibid
[4] Lee Epstein, William M. Landes and
Richard A. Posner, 'Are Even Unanimous Decisions in the United States Supreme
Court Ideological?', Northwestern University Law Review, vol. 106, 2012, pp.
699-714, p. 701. The data relates only to orally argued cases.
[5] 1978
AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621
[6] WP (C) 494/2012
[7] https://youtu.be/qdq_c6qr17M
[8] Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1856)

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